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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
AND  
WELL-BEING ANALYSIS? 
LISA A. ROBINSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Under Executive Order 12,866,1 as supplemented by Executive 
Order 13,563,2 federal agencies are required to prospectively assess 
the costs and benefits of significant regulations, and also to assess the 
costs and benefits of alternatives if the annual impacts of the 
regulations are expected to be equal to or greater than $100 million.3 
These analytic requirements can be traced back to the Ford 
administration, which used cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to determine 
whether major regulations would have inflationary impacts.4 More 
generally, the roots of such analyses can be traced back to the 1800s, 
when economists began developing the foundations of welfare 
economics that underlie the practice of CBA today. 
In recent years, some psychologists and economists have become 
increasingly interested in how individuals rate their own happiness or 
life satisfaction—often referred to as subjective well-being. In their 
provocative article, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and 
Jonathan Masur criticize the conduct of CBA, focusing on the 
approaches used to value outcomes such as increased prices, 
unemployment, and reduced mortality risks.5 They argue that well-
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 1. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
note at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 126 (Supp. V 2012).  
 2. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). 
 3. Id.; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638. Implementing guidance is provided in 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
 4. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 10–11 (1997). 
 5. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-
Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).  
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being analysis (WBA) would effectively address their criticisms by 
replacing the monetary measures of value used in CBA with well-
being units.6 As a counterpoint, Matthew Adler explores the research 
on subjective well-being in detail.7 He concludes that the use of well-
being data in policy evaluation is premature, given the need to clarify 
how well-being should be defined as well as the need to improve how 
it is measured.8 
Framing this discussion as “WBA versus CBA” seems far too 
narrow, however. CBA and WBA aim to provide different types of 
information, both of which are likely to be of interest to 
decisionmakers. CBA is not, and should not be, the sole basis for 
decisionmaking. Rather, it answers a particular question: How can we 
best allocate scarce resources, given our understanding of individuals’ 
preferences? In CBA, preferences are measured by individuals’ 
willingness to trade money (which represents the ability to purchase 
other goods and services) for the benefits provided by a particular 
regulation. WBA asks a somewhat different question: How can we 
best allocate these resources, given our understanding of individuals’ 
subjective well-being? In this case, well-being is measured by how 
individuals rate the happiness or life satisfaction associated with 
various states of being, such as income level or degree of health 
impairment. Those involved in the policymaking process have diverse 
interests and goals, and are likely to find these—as well as other types 
of analysis—useful. 
CBA’s longevity—and the substantial resources devoted to its 
development and implementation—suggests that policymakers find 
that it aids them in making difficult choices. CBA is not the only type 
of analysis used to inform regulatory decisionmaking, however. 
Government-wide guidelines instruct agencies to also prepare cost-
effectiveness analyses.9 These analyses involve dividing regulatory 
 
 6. Id. at 1617–18. 
 7. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 
62 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2013). 
 8. Id. at 1599.  
 9. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 9 (“Both benefit-cost analysis 
(BCA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) provide a systematic framework for identifying 
and evaluating the likely outcomes of alternative regulatory choices. A major rulemaking 
should be supported by both types of analysis wherever possible. Specifically, you should 
prepare a CEA for all major rulemakings for which the primary benefits are improved public 
health and safety to the extent that a valid effectiveness measure can be developed to represent 
expected health and safety outcomes. You should also perform a BCA for major health and 
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costs by an effect measure—such as tons of pollution averted, number 
of lives extended, or quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained—to 
estimate the cost per unit of benefit.10 Agencies also often use break-
even analysis to determine how large nonquantified benefits would 
need to be to equal the costs of the rule.11 Both types of analyses are 
designed in part to address the difficulties inherent in estimating 
diverse regulatory impacts and in determining their dollar value, and 
in part to provide differing types of information. 
In this Commentary, I begin with some background information 
on the conduct of regulatory CBA and its role in decisionmaking to 
provide context for what follows. I then discuss how CBA deals with 
selected issues that have implications for the further development of 
WBA. I conclude that WBA could be a useful supplement to CBA, 
but that more work is needed to determine how it can be best 
implemented. 
I.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY REALM 
In the United States, the starting point for regulatory CBA is 
often an authorizing statute that requires an agency to take action to 
address a particular problem or set of problems. The statute typically 
defines the goals of such action and establishes some constraints on 
what action may be undertaken.12 After the agency identifies the 
options to be assessed, it estimates baseline conditions in the absence 
of intervention and likely responses to each option. Both are 
predictive exercises: most regulations are not implemented 
immediately, and many years may elapse before the regulations’ 
effects are fully felt. As a result, baseline conditions and the effects of 
each option may change over the time period considered. Economic 
theory, combined with scientific evidence, provides the foundation for 
 
safety rulemakings to the extent that valid monetary values can be assigned to the primary 
expected health and safety outcomes.”). 
 10. For more information on the use of this approach in regulatory analysis, see generally 
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VALUING HEALTH FOR REGULATORY COST-
EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (Wilhelmine Miller, Lisa A. Robinson & Robert S. Lawrence eds., 
2006). 
 11. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 2 (“If the non-quantified benefits and 
costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a ‘threshold’ analysis to evaluate their 
significance. Threshold or ‘break-even’ analysis answers the question, ‘How small could the 
value of the non-quantified benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified 
costs need to be) before the rule would yield zero net benefits?’”). 
 12. The authorizing statute may also circumscribe the extent to which CBA may be used in 
setting regulatory requirements. 
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these predictions and valuations, allowing analysts to build on many 
decades of research in explaining and forecasting behavior. 
Although the effects of the regulatory options are typically 
divided into costs and benefits, there is no principled distinction: 
decreased benefits can be categorized as costs, and decreased costs 
can be categorized as benefits. Often (but not always), regulatory 
analysts use the term “costs” to refer to the reallocation of real 
resources associated with regulatory compliance, including direct 
compliance expenditures, any offsetting savings, and resulting impacts 
on market supply and demand. Consistent with economic theory, the 
value of a real resource is determined by its opportunity cost—its 
value in its best or most beneficial use. Thus the cost of a regulation is 
estimated based on the net opportunity cost of forgone goods and 
services that result when regulatory compliance reallocates resources 
away from what would otherwise be produced and consumed.13 
These costs usually can be estimated using market data.14 For 
example, for an air-pollution regulation that addresses industrial 
emissions, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would 
collect data on the types of technology and process changes that the 
industry could implement to meet the requirements, and would then 
predict which options would be implemented by firms with various 
characteristics and estimate the total costs that result. The EPA 
would also consider the effects of compliance costs on supply and 
demand conditions in the regulated industry, as well as the effects on 
markets for related goods and services.15 
The term “benefits” is generally (but again, not universally) used 
to refer to the purpose for which such resource reallocation is 
required—that is, the statutory or other goals that the regulation is 
intended to achieve. For regulations subject to the executive-order 
analytic requirements, these goals often include decreasing risks to 
 
 13. In this context, market rates are used to discount future impacts to reflect the 
opportunity costs of diverting resources from other uses over time. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, supra note 3, at 31–35; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 240-R-10-001, GUIDELINES 
FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-1 to 6-20 (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/
ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf. 
 14. For more information on how both costs and benefits are estimated in regulatory 
analysis, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 14–42; and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 13, at 5-1 to 8-26. 
 15. The analyses of costs and benefits generally include both qualitative discussion and 
quantitative assessment of uncertainty. For related requirements, see OFFICE OF INFO. & 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 4, at 38–42, and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 
13, at 5-1 to 8-26. 
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human health (or safety) and longevity as well as to the 
environment.16 
For outcomes such as decreased health and environmental risks, 
valuation is more difficult because these risk reductions are not 
normally bought and sold in the marketplace. Thus, nonmarket 
methods must be used to estimate individual willingness to pay 
(WTP) or individual willingness to accept compensation (WTA).17 
For a beneficial outcome, such as decreased health risks, WTP 
represents the maximum amount of money an individual would 
voluntarily exchange to obtain the improvement, given his or her 
budget constraints, whereas WTA is the smallest amount an 
individual would accept to forego the improvement. In either case, 
consistent with the concept of opportunity cost, money is used to 
indicate the amount of other goods and services an individual would 
willingly trade to obtain or forgo the improvement. Regulatory 
analysts often rely on WTP rather than WTA estimates, both because 
WTP studies often dominate the relevant valuation literature and 
because regulatory analyses typically address improvements from the 
status quo rather than compensation for forgoing an improvement.18 
 
 16. Air-pollution regulations issued by the EPA dominate the set of regulations that are 
subject to the executive-order analytic requirements, both in terms of the number of regulations 
and the magnitude of their impacts. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRAFT 2012 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED 
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 13–14 tbl.1-2 (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/draft_2012_cost_benefit_report.pdf. 
 17. The concepts of compensating and equivalent variation (or compensating and 
equivalent surplus for public goods) underlie the use of WTP and WTA. See A. MYRICK 
FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 43–94 (2D 
ED. 2003) (reviewing the basic theory of defining and measuring welfare changes). 
Compensating variation refers to the payment that would make the individual indifferent 
between choosing the original situation and a change; equivalent variation refers to the change 
in income that would lead to the same change in utility as the change in price. The two measures 
differ in their starting points: for a beneficial outcome, compensating variation references the 
level of utility without the improvement, whereas equivalent variation references the level with 
the improvement. Id. Although there is some dispute over the meaning of utility in this context, 
conventionally it is generally understood as a sense of satisfaction associated with the 
consumption of goods and services—where goods include tangible items and services include 
intangibles. 
 18. For more discussion of the theoretical and empirical differences between WTP and 
WTA, see Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory 
Analysis, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 1408, 1412–14 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson & Hammitt, 
Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis]; and Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, 
Behavioral Economics and the Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis: Towards Principles and 
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Nonmarket valuation methods include stated- and revealed-
preference studies. Stated-preference studies typically employ survey 
techniques to ask respondents about their WTP for the outcome of 
concern. They include contingent valuation surveys, which elicit WTP 
for the scenario(s) described in the survey. They also include choice 
experiments (or conjoint analyses), which present respondents with 
several scenarios involving outcomes with differing attributes and 
prices. Estimates of WTP are derived from the way in which 
respondents rank, rate, or construct equivalent sets of alternatives. 
Stated-preference methods are attractive because researchers can 
tailor them to directly value the outcome(s) of concern; that is, the 
survey can describe the specific health or environmental risks 
associated with the hazards addressed by a regulation as well as the 
characteristics of those affected. A key concern, however, is that 
respondents may have little incentive to respond accurately because 
the payment is hypothetical. Conducting a study that is likely to yield 
reasonably accurate and reliable results requires careful design and 
implementation, following best-practice recommendations developed 
through many years of methodological experimentation.19 
Revealed-preference methods consider observed behaviors or 
prices and preferences for related market goods.20 For example, wage-
risk (or hedonic-wage) studies examine the change in compensation 
associated with jobs that involve differing risks of fatal or nonfatal 
injury, using statistical methods to separate the effects of these risks 
from the effects of other job and personal characteristics.21 Although 
this indirect use of market data has the advantage of relying on actual 
transactions, it is often difficult to find a market good that can be used 
to value particular regulatory outcomes. In addition, care must be 
taken to effectively control for the other variables that affect wages or 
 
Standards, 2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS, Apr. 2011, at 1, 9–18 [hereinafter Robinson & 
Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and the Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis]. 
 19. Sources of recent best-practice guidance are numerous. See, e.g., IAN J. BATEMAN ET 
AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002); 
HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (Anna Alberini & James R. Kahn eds., 2006). 
 20. The term “revealed preferences” is used to describe market behavior as well as these 
nonmarket valuation methods. 
 21. Such studies typically compare wages and risks across a cross section of individuals at a 
particular point in time, although more longitudinal studies are now emerging. For an example 
of a cross-sectional study, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by 
Occupation and Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (2004). For an example of a longitudinal study, 
see Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi, Christopher Woock & James P. Ziliak, The Value of a 
Statistical Life: Evidence from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74 (2012). 
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market prices. Because both methods have advantages and 
limitations, the choice often depends on the characteristics of the 
outcome being valued (for example, whether it can be modeled as an 
attribute of a market good in a revealed-preference study), as well as 
on the availability of well-conducted studies.22  
Ideally, the values used in regulatory analysis would reflect the 
characteristics of those affected as well as the characteristics of the 
regulatory outcomes, given that preferences for exchanging money 
for various market and nonmarket goods and services are likely to 
vary depending on these characteristics. In reality, these analyses 
generally rely on population-average values. In other words, the same 
values are used regardless of whether a regulation disproportionally 
affects the wealthy or the poor, or the young or the old. This practice 
results in part from gaps in the research literature, but it also reflects 
concerns about the distribution of the impacts.23 For example, EPA’s 
use of lower values for older individuals when conducting sensitivity 
analysis of the value of mortality risk reductions led to a significant 
outcry, suggesting that many view the use of averages as more fair or 
equitable than the use of values that vary depending on population 
characteristics. Whether the use of average values is in fact fair 
depends on how fairness is defined: averages may not reflect the 
preferences of those affected by the allocation of available resources. 
Otherwise, regulatory analyses generally consider distributional 
effects (who gains and who loses) separately from economic efficiency 
(the net national benefits of the regulation). The standard rationale 
for this distinction is that the tax and income-support system can 
achieve redistributional goals more efficiently than a regulation that 
is primarily designed for other purposes. For example, if an 
environmental regulation makes the wealthy wealthier and the poor 
poorer, the tax and income-support system can be designed to take 
away the gains and redistribute the funds to the losers. Money 
 
 22. Typically, regulatory analysts rely on existing valuation studies given the substantial 
time and expense associated with conducting new primary research. This benefit-transfer 
approach requires careful review of the literature to identify high-quality studies that address an 
outcome sufficiently similar to the outcome of the regulation. Most regulatory analyses value 
various outcomes (for example, morbidity risks, mortality risks, or ecological risks) separately. 
They then aggregate the results (taking care to avoid double counting) using a damage-function 
approach because relatively few primary-research studies yield values that account for all of the 
effects of an individual regulation (for example, all of the impacts associated with  less polluted 
air). See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at  7-51 to 7-57. 
 23. Lisa A. Robinson, How U.S. Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions, 1 
REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, 283, 295 (2007). 
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transfers can be targeted on the outcome (income) and the 
population of concern (the poor), while other types of policies 
typically provide more heterogeneous benefits (such as reductions in 
air pollution-related health and ecological risks) to more 
heterogeneous populations (both rich and poor individuals living in 
areas with high air pollution). 
Regardless of whether one accepts this rationale, policymakers 
are interested in information on regulations’ distributional effects. 
Agencies are required to report such information under the 
guidelines for regulatory analysis—as well as under other statutes and 
executive orders—and may be required to alter the regulation if 
certain groups (for example, children, low-income populations, or 
minority groups) are likely to be disproportionately harmed.24 
The approaches used in regulatory analysis have evolved 
significantly over time, as experience with these methods has 
increased researchers’ understanding of how to best estimate the 
value of regulatory impacts. For example, Maureen Cropper, James 
K. Hammitt, and I discuss the many ways in which the methods used 
to estimate the value of mortality risk reductions (the Value per 
Statistical Life or VSL) have improved in recent years.25 These 
improvements have led to more stringent criteria for evaluating the 
quality of individual studies and for determining which estimates are 
most suitable for use in regulatory analysis. EPA historically relied on 
a set of twenty-six VSL studies, identified in a 1992 review, that 
included twenty-one revealed-preference studies of job-related risks 
and five stated-preference studies.26 The resulting VSL estimates 
ranged from less than $1 million to almost $20 million, with a central 
estimate of $7.4 million (2006 dollars). More recently, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) applied new best-practice 
criteria that resulted largely from an EPA Science Advisory Board 
review of a paper developed by EPA staff.27 The DOT identified nine 
 
 24. For requirements related to impacts on children and low-income and minority groups, 
see Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 C.F.R. 198 (1998), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(2006); and Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 25. See generally Maureen Cropper, James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing 
Mortality Risk Reductions: Progress and Challenges, 3 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 313 (2011). 
 26. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at B-1 to B-2. 
 27. The EPA has not yet determined how to best implement the resulting 
recommendations in its own analyses. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY 
RISK REDUCTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 46–47 (2010), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0563-1.pdf/$file/ee-0563-1.pdf (“These studies 
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labor-market studies suitable for use in its regulatory analyses that 
result in estimates ranging from about $7 million to about $13 million, 
with a mean of $9.1 million (2012 dollars).28 None of these studies had 
been completed at the time of the original EPA review; the DOT 
rejected all of the older studies due to the availability of improved 
data sources as well as evolving understanding of best practices. 
Another example of CBA’s evolution is the estimation of 
employment impacts. The conventional wisdom is that regulation will 
increase production costs in the affected industries, and that these 
costs will be passed on to consumers as increased prices, which will 
lead to decreases in the quantities demanded, thereby reducing 
employment. Recent research suggests that this set of assumptions is 
flawed because it fails to consider the underlying characteristics of the 
affected firms and markets as well as the many ways in which they 
may respond to a regulation. Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. 
Pizer and Jhih-Shyang Shih note that industry and market conditions 
may limit the extent to which costs are passed on to consumers as well 
as the extent to which price changes affect demand.29 In addition, as 
production costs rise, more labor and other inputs may be required to 
produce the same output. Compliance activities also may be more or 
less labor intensive than pre-regulatory production. Thus, regulation 
may lead employment to increase, decrease, or remain the same. 
CBA is rarely, if ever, the sole basis for regulatory 
decisionmaking. Agency decisions must, first and foremost, comply 
with the authorizing statute and related rulings by the courts. In 
 
could be combined or synthesized in a number of ways . . . . Our goal is to provide enough 
information on the analytical options and key issues to receive clear recommendations from the 
SAB-EEAC on an approach to implement for updating our guidance and on future research 
directions.”); see also Catherine L. Kling & Deborah L. Swackhamer, Review of Valuing 
Morality Risk Reductions for Environmental Policy: A White Paper (Dec. 10, 2010), at 1, 
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/298E1F50F844BC23852578DC0059 A6 
16/ $File/EPA-SAB-11-011-unsigned.pdf (responding to the EPA’s request for 
recommendations). 
 28. Memorandum from Polly Trottenberg, Under Sec’y for Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., & 
Robert S. Rivkin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, 
Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S. Department of 
Transportation Analyses 5–6 (Feb. 28, 2013), available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/ 
docs/ VSL %20 Guidance.doc. 
 29. Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. Pizer & Jhih-Shyang Shih, Jobs Versus the 
Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective, 43 J. ENVTL.. ECON. & MGMT. 412 (2002). For a 
discussion of evolving best practices, see Lisa A. Robinson, Toward Best Practices: Assessing the 
Effects of Regulation on Employment, in JOBS AND REGULATION (Cary Coglianese, Adam 
Finkel & Chris Carrigan eds.) (forthcoming 2013), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
mrcbg/rpp/Working%20papers/RPP_2013_02_Robinson.pdf. 
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addition, most regulations have potentially significant impacts that 
cannot be quantified but are important to decisionmakers and other 
stakeholders. Physical outcomes (for example, lives extended, 
illnesses averted, or stream-miles protected) must be estimated before 
they can be valued, but it can be extraordinarily difficult to answer 
questions like: How does this regulation affect the ecological health 
of the region? Or: To what extent does this regulation affect the 
probability and consequences of terrorist attacks?30 As mentioned 
earlier, agencies often supplement or replace CBA with cost-
effectiveness analysis or break-even analysis due largely to difficulties 
in quantifying or valuing benefits, consistent with related 
government-wide guidance.31 CBA can best be understood as one of 
many tools that provide useful information for decisionmaking. 
WBA faces many of the same challenges as CBA. Some are 
independent of the type of analysis that is conducted: statutory 
constraints can only be changed by congressional action, and 
quantification of additional impacts requires scientific research. 
However, as illustrated by the examples of evolving practices noted 
above, understanding what is being measured, and how to best 
measure it, is a challenge that CBA practitioners have worked to 
address for many years, and one that WBA practitioners now face. 
II.  SOME ISSUES AND OBSERVATIONS 
Why is CBA useful? Fully answering this question requires far 
more space than is available here, but I provide some observations 
that seem relevant to the comparison of CBA and WBA as well as to 
the further development of WBA. I address the selection of values, 
the inclusion of mental and emotional states in valuation, the respect 
for individual preferences, and the mechanism for achieving 
redistributional goals. 
 
 30. The EPA routinely includes lists of several potentially significant effects of air pollution 
on human and ecological health that it is unable to quantify in its regulatory analyses. See, e.g., 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
PARTICLE POLLUTION: CHAPTER 5: BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 5-1, 5-5 tbl.5-2 (2006), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/Chapter%205--Benefits.pdf. 
 31. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 3, at 2, 9–14. The U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget provides annual reports to Congress that document the extent to 
which full CBAs have been conducted for the regulations reviewed each year and that discuss 
related issues. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 16, at 21–31. 
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A. Selecting Values 
Both CBA and WBA face the challenge of determining how best 
to value outcomes, given limitations in the available research. In 
CBA, theory is directly linked to practice, aiding analysts in 
identifying preferred methods for valuation and in selecting among 
available studies. Although there are many unresolved or disputed 
issues, this foundation enables analysts to explain what it is that they 
are trying to measure (WTP or WTA), to describe the methods that 
would ideally be used for such measurement (revealed or stated 
preferences), to identify research practices that are most likely to lead 
to accurate and reliable results, and to discuss how the limitations in 
the available data and research affect the estimates. 
In contrast, WBA is in its infancy. As Professor Adler notes, 
there are many conceptual issues that need to be resolved before an 
overarching framework can be developed that relates measures of 
well-being to policy goals.32 The lack of such a framework makes it 
difficult to determine what measures of well-being and what methods 
of measurement are most appropriately applied in WBA. The lack of 
a framework also makes it difficult to describe the uncertainties or 
biases that result when alternative measures are used as proxies. For 
instance, in their illustrative example, Professors Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco, and Masur use one study to estimate the well-being 
effects of changes in income and morbidity, a second study to 
estimate the effects of premature death, and a third study to estimate 
the effects of unemployment. They do not discuss whether the three 
studies use similar approaches to estimate changes in well-being. 
More generally, they do not describe how the uncertainties inherent 
in the selected studies affect the interpretation of their results.33 
Similar issues arise in CBA. For example, the lack of WTP 
estimates for nonfatal health risks means that analysts often use cost-
 
 32. Adler, supra note 7, at 1584.  
 33. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 5, at 1640–43. Although Professors 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur claim that their example demonstrates the feasibility and 
usefulness of WBA, id. at 1645, this claim is difficult to assess. They make several assumptions 
(for example, the extent to which costs are passed on to consumers, the number of consumers 
affected, consumers’ average income, cancer latency, duration of unemployment, and so forth) 
that appear to be arbitrary. See id. at 1639–45. Would the analysis come to the same conclusions 
if different assumptions were applied? They also select a relatively old analysis from 1998, id. at 
1633, that does not reflect more recent advances in valuation or in the approaches used to assess 
the effects of regulations on employment. 
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of-illness or monetized QALYs as proxies.34 Although it is difficult to 
quantify the uncertainty introduced by the use of these proxies, 
analysts can discuss their strengths and limitations based on 
substantial theoretical and empirical research, and can test the 
sensitivity of their results to different values. 
The example in Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur’s 
article also suggests that studies of subjective well-being do not 
currently provide values for many of the outcomes of concern in 
regulatory analysis.35 In addition to the question of whether life-
satisfaction, moment-by-moment, or other measures should be used, 
an obvious problem is that the example uses estimates for 
“stomach/liver/kidneys or digestive problems” to measure the effects 
of cancers on well-being.36 A perhaps less-obvious problem is that the 
example compares well-being with and without the condition, rather 
than addressing the small change in the risk of experiencing that 
condition that is associated with the regulation.37 
Regulatory analysts have developed criteria for transferring 
values from one context to another to more rigorously address these 
types of problems in CBA. The starting point is a description of the 
regulatory outcome, followed by a search for potentially relevant 
valuation studies. Analysts then review the studies for quality and 
applicability. The quality assessment considers, for example, the 
extent to which each study follows generally accepted best practices 
and provides evidence of validity and reliability. The applicability 
assessment considers factors such as the similarity of the risks, the 
similarity of the populations experiencing the risks, and the ability to 
adjust for differences between the outcome studied and the 
regulatory outcome. Depending on the research available, the 
transfer may rely on a single study or combine the results from 
 
 34. See Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Skills of the Trade: Valuing Health Risk 
Reductions in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS, Mar. 2013, at 107, 116–123. 
 35. The example is based on a 1998 regulatory analysis that addresses only three outcomes 
(that is, changes in income, unemployment, and cancer risks), see Bronsteen, Buccafusco & 
Masur, supra note 5, at 1633–39, whereas many more-recent regulatory analyses consider a 
wider range of health and environmental risks, using data and methods that have improved over 
time, e,g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 7-1 to 9-22. The extent to which well-
being measures are available for these wider ranges of outcomes is unclear. 
 36. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 5, at 1641–42. 
 37. See id. Typically, regulatory analysts are able to estimate risk changes across a large 
population, but they are not able to identify in advance (nor necessarily able to determine after 
the regulation is implemented) the individuals affected—for example, which individuals would 
have become ill or died prematurely in the absence of the regulation.  
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several studies, and it may involve transferring a point estimate or a 
valuation function that tailors the estimate to the policy scenario. The 
uncertainties in the estimates are then addressed qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively—for example, by conducting sensitivity or probabilistic 
analysis and discussing the implications. A similar approach is needed 
for WBA to aid in the selection of suitable, high quality well-being 
estimates and to provide information on associated uncertainties.38 
One possible next step in the development of WBA could 
involve reviewing completed regulatory analyses to identify the types 
of outcomes in need of valuation, and then reviewing the well-being 
literature to determine the extent to which well-being estimates are 
available for these outcomes. This work could be used both to 
identify areas where more well-being research is needed and to 
catalog the available estimates for further review for quality and 
suitability. 
B. Including Mental or Emotional States in Valuation 
CBA and WBA would presumably use the same approach for 
predicting baseline conditions and the effects of the regulatory 
options. The only difference is that WBA would value outcomes in 
well-being units rather than in dollars, reflecting the psychological 
impact of the outcomes. Such psychological impacts are, however, 
already included in the measures used in CBA. Economists generally 
recognize that decisions to purchase market goods and services, as 
well as WTP for nonmarket goods or services, reflect psychological 
responses to their attributes and other aspects of their consumption. 
Ideally, the research studies used for valuation in CBA would address 
an outcome that is identical to the outcome addressed by the 
regulation, so that it elicits the same sort of responses to its attributes. 
However, as noted above, gaps in the research literature often mean 
that analysts transfer values from somewhat dissimilar contexts. 
For example, when determining what studies to use to value 
mortality risk reductions associated with homeland-security 
regulations, my colleagues and I compared the outcomes addressed in 
 
 38. For further discussion of benefit transfer, see Robinson & Hammitt, supra note 34, at 
109–111; and U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 7-51 to 7-57. An example of this 
approach is the valuation of homeland-security related mortality risk reductions, as discussed 
below. 
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available empirical research with the regulatory outcomes.39 This 
comparison included the characteristics of those affected (for 
example, age or income), of the risk itself (for example, illness versus 
injury, or immediate versus latent effects), and of psychological 
responses to the risk (for example, the degree to which it is 
voluntarily incurred, viewed as under the individual’s control, or 
particularly fearsome).40 Our team ultimately recommended applying 
the results from a study of job-related risks because we were unable 
to identify a high-quality study that addresses risks more similar to 
those associated with homeland-security regulations.41 However, we 
noted that, based on the available research, homeland-security-
related mortality risk reductions might be valued up to two times 
higher than more commonplace risks.42 
Thus the approach to valuation currently followed in CBA 
appears to account for the types of psychological states measured in 
research on subjective well-being, although it does not ask the same 
questions nor use the same scales. The measures it uses appear to be 
more complete than the measures proposed for use in WBA because 
the former encompass other aspects of value and more varied mental 
and emotional states. This does not necessarily mean that there is no 
role for WBA, however. Supplementing CBA by also reporting the 
value of outcomes in well-being units has the advantage of 
highlighting these impacts, which may also be of interest to 
decisionmakers. 
C. Respecting Individual Preferences 
Whether policy interventions should be selected so as to reflect 
the preferences of those affected is a contentious normative issue that 
I do not attempt to resolve here. However, information on these 
preferences is a useful input into the policymaking process, aiding 
decisionmakers in understanding the extent to which their own 
preferences are and are not shared by those affected. 
 
 39. Lisa A. Robinson, James K. Hammitt, Joseph E. Aldy, Alan Krupnick & Jennifer 
Baxter, Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks, 7 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & 
EMERGENCY MGMT., Feb. 2010, at 18. This article is an abbreviated and updated version of the 
report that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security now uses to support the values it applies 
in its regulatory analyses. 
 40. Id. at 10–18. 
 41. Id. at 9. 
 42. Id. at 17. 
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When the government regulates, it requires society to reallocate 
resources to achieve particular social welfare goals. For example, an 
air-pollution regulation that addresses motor-vehicle emissions is 
likely to increase the costs of automobiles while reducing associated 
health risks.43 CBA reflects these trade-offs by estimating how those 
affected would weigh the costs and benefits that result. If market data 
can be used, CBA indicates the actual trade-offs that individuals 
make; if nonmarket valuation is needed, CBA’s goal is to estimate 
individuals’ willingness to make such trade-offs. More fundamentally, 
CBA—and the welfare-economic theory upon which it is based—
respects individual preferences, assuming that each individual is the 
best judge of his or her own welfare. 
WBA does not tell us how individuals prefer to allocate 
resources. Whereas statistical analysis can be used to estimate the 
relationship between measures of subjective well-being and income, 
such analysis does not indicate whether the affected individuals would 
willingly exchange income for that level of well-being. Nor does 
WBA ask individuals how they would prefer to allocate money across 
different goods and services, including nonmarket outcomes such as 
improved health. Rather, it assumes that individuals would prefer to 
see resources allocated so as to achieve a higher level of subjective 
well-being, however defined. Thus, if used as a decision criterion, 
WBA is more paternalistic: the analyst decides that money should be 
allocated so as to maximize well-being, even if those affected would 
prefer to allocate resources differently. 
Of course, individuals may make mistakes in identifying their 
preferences, whether revealed directly through market behavior or 
indirectly through stated- or revealed-preference studies. These 
mistakes may result from cognitive errors (for example, limitations in 
information-processing capacity or misunderstandings of 
probabilities), which, if pointed out to the individual, he or she would 
wish to correct.44 For example, an individual may begin smoking 
because he or she does not understand the likelihood of addiction, the 
difficulty of quitting, or the associated health risks. In other cases, 
behavior that is labeled as a mistake may in fact reflect an individual’s 
 
 43. Regulatory costs may be absorbed, at least in part, by the firm rather than fully passed 
on to consumers, potentially affecting profits and wages as well as, or instead of, prices. 
 44. See James K. Hammitt, Positive v. Normative Justifications for Benefit-Cost Analysis 9–
10 (Regulatory Policy Program, Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Harvard Kennedy 
Sch., Working Paper No. 13, 2012). 
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true preferences. Some may choose to smoke even if well informed, 
because they are risk seeking rather than risk averse, or because they 
find that the pleasures of smoking outweigh its risks. How to address 
affective forecasting errors also raises difficult issues. Although the 
evidence suggests that individuals adapt to adverse conditions more 
than predicted, they may have strong preferences regarding avoiding 
the transition. To take a perhaps extreme example, research suggests 
that paraplegics and quadriplegics report higher levels of well-being 
than expected.45 However, individuals still may have very strong 
preferences for reducing the likelihood of transitioning into a 
paraplegic or quadriplegic state. 
To the extent that decisionmakers can identify whether market 
choices or expressed preferences are errors, they may wish to correct 
the errors when applying values in CBA.46 However, it is often 
difficult to separate errors from true preferences. More generally, 
research by behavioral economists suggests that such errors are 
context dependent, and additional work is needed to understand how 
the decisionmaking anomalies and biases identified in that literature 
affect the choices reflected in regulatory analysis.47 Such concerns 
require thinking carefully about the extent to which normative 
concerns are integrated into the conduct of CBA, but they are not a 
sufficient reason to abandon it.48 In fact, some argue that CBA acts as 
a corrective by providing evidence to counter decisionmaking biases.49 
 
 45. See, e.g., Richard Schulz & Susan Decker, Long-term Adjustment to Physical Disability: 
The Role of Social Support, Perceived Control, and Self-blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1162, 1170 (1985). 
 46. See Robinson & Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and Regulatory Analysis, supra note 
18, at 1410–12 (describing behavioral-economics theories and techniques that can more 
accurately model costs and benefits); Robinson & Hammitt, Behavioral Economics and the 
Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis, supra note 18, at 13–16 (“Ideally, the values used in benefit-
cost analysis would reflect all of the attributes of the risk, including the ambiguity and fear 
associated specifically with that risk.” (citation omitted)). For a discussion of “laundering” 
preferences, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 149–53 (2006). 
 47. For a relatively recent review of the research evidence, see Stefano DellaVigna, 
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009). 
 48. For further discussion of positive and normative conceptions of CBA, see James K. 
Hammitt, Response, Saving Lives: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distribution, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 189, 195–98 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2009/Hammitt.pdf; 
and Hammitt, supra note 44. For discussion of how positive and normative considerations enter 
into the conduct of individual CBAs, see Christopher Robert & Richard Zeckhauser, The 
Methodology of Normative Policy Analysis, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 613 (2011).  
 49. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1088–
96 (2000). 
ROBINSON IN PRINTER PROOF.V2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  10:35 AM 
2013] CBA & WBA? 1733 
Such concerns also raise questions about whether similar phenomena 
may affect the responses to questions about happiness and life 
satisfaction. 
D. Achieving Redistributional Goals 
The theoretic framework that underlies CBA also defines its 
boundaries. As conventionally conducted, it focuses on economic 
efficiency. Thus, supplementary information is needed to address 
other outcomes of interest to decisionmakers, such as the distribution 
of the impacts. 
More precisely, in CBA the normative justification for choosing 
policies that maximize net benefits is the Kaldor-Hicks potential-
compensation test. This test suggests that a policy is desirable if it 
makes the winners better off by an amount large enough to 
compensate the losers, or alternatively, that it should be rejected if 
the losers can compensate the winners to not pursue the policy. 
However, the test does not demand that actual compensation occur. 
Although applying this test maximizes social welfare as defined 
within this framework—that is, as the efficient allocation of scarce 
resources—it does not address the net effect on the distribution of 
resources. Any regulation is likely to have both winners and losers. 
Although who gains and who loses will vary across policies, in total 
the gains and losses are not likely to balance at the individual level. 
When benefits and costs are measured in money terms, then 
money can be redistributed, to the extent desired, to compensate the 
losers.50 For instance, as noted earlier, a well-designed tax and 
income-transfer system can be used to achieve redistributional goals. 
But if net well-being is used as a decision criterion, how can well-
being be redistributed? Presumably, decisions based on the net 
change in well-being will also lead to gains for some and losses for 
others, but measuring these values in well-being units rather than in 
dollars does not provide a mechanism for addressing any inequities 
that result. Although more thought into how distributional concerns 
might be addressed in WBA would be useful, this issue may be of 
lesser concern if we keep in mind how analysis is generally used in 
regulatory decisionmaking. As noted earlier, analysis generally 
provides information for decisions but does not determine them. In 
 
 50. For simplicity, this brief discussion ignores the complexities of transfers, such as the 
role of administrative costs and the distortionary effects of taxes.  
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this context, WBA may provide a useful supplement to CBA, 
providing additional information rather than a different criterion for 
decisionmaking. 
CONCLUSION: WELL-BEING ANALYSIS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO  
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Whereas CBA is viewed as a useful framework for providing 
information, it is not and should not be the only framework used to 
inform decisionmaking. Further development of WBA could provide 
a useful complement that highlights the effects of regulatory changes 
on self-reported well-being. Work is needed, however, to better 
define the conceptual framework, to understand advantages and 
limitations of alternative approaches to measurement, and to develop 
criteria for selecting well-being estimates based on their quality and 
suitability for a particular context. Like the approaches applied in 
CBA, the approaches applied in WBA are likely to evolve over time, 
and beginning to implement WBA may provide both incentives to 
conduct related research and insights into how well-being measures 
can be improved. 
Qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis of related 
uncertainties are also needed. In CBA the shortcomings of various 
valuation approaches are relatively well understood from both a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. As a result, analysts can at 
minimum describe the limitations of the approach and the 
implications. Professor Adler’s discussion and Professors Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco, and Masur’s illustrative example suggest that more 
theoretical and empirical work is needed to better understand the 
limitations and uncertainties associated with applying the WBA 
approach. Presumably, the goal of both CBA and WBA is to support 
evidence-based decisionmaking, which requires the ability to discuss 
both the nature of the evidence and its shortcomings. 
 
